

connection. At age 44, he is one of the younger stars of the government scientific advisory system, having extensive service with Jason and PSAC while a professor of physics at Columbia University and director of the affiliated IBM Watson Laboratory. Alvarez described Garwin as one of the brightest and most knowledgeable people in the advising business, an opinion which seems to be widely shared. Several Jasons have pointed out that Garwin was appointed to a second term on PSAC even after he had published (with Bethe) the famous article in Scientific American which publicly criticized the Pentagon's plans for the ABM system. This is offered as proof that Jason and PSAC people retain their independence.

A second story about Garwin concerns the SST (super-sonic transport airplane). Apparently, he knew of a secret PSAC report which was critical of the government's plans for the SST; by leaking information to some Congressmen, Garwin eventually forced the White House to release the report.

What interests us particularly about Garwin is the fact that it was his name which came up most consistently in our research on the development of the automated battlefield. Garwin was placed on Jason's steering committee in 1967; he was the leader of the 1968 (Tet) scientist group visiting Vietnam, and he was later identified as one of the members of the scientific advisory committee to the DCPG (1970).

On the basis of this meagre evidence alone we could conclude that Garwin's secret service for the Pentagon and for the White House has been so rewarding to them that they are willing to tolerate his occasional public deviations.

In any case, the "insider" style

of criticism appears to be limited to means rather than ends. There is no evidence that Jasons advised, say, that the U.S. start abiding by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, or even that it abstain from any of the cruelest excesses of the war. Jason's counsel to stop the bombing of the North was on the basis that it wasn't working, not on the basis that it was better for Vietnamese to live than to die. The objectives of the military effort were not open to question in the mind of the Pentagon, who was paying for the advice. Jason seems to have accepted this definition of the bargain. Not whether to suppress guerrillas in Thailand, but only how.

Indeed, many scientists argue that their professional role is to answer scientific questions, and only as citizens can they influence policy. Though the Jason scientists did not rely on this argument, it is more in tune with the "neutral technician" role they seem to take: using their objectivity and perspective on the military endeavor, not to influence what it is doing, but to help the military do whatever it is doing better.

Now we see a still more convincing explanation for working in Jason:

3. THE EFFECTIVENESS THEORY

The government should act on the basis of the best available information. If Jason didn't offer scientific advice, someone else, less competent, would. "Smart scientists make better weapons than dumb ones."

Now there is no doubt that both the scientific excellence of these top advisors and their relative objectivity can help the earnest McNamaras and their generals to accomplish their ob-

jectives better. If we agree, and many of the Jasons do, that those objectives have been noxious, then this would seem a strange reason to justify their service to them! More explanation is required.

3A. THE PLEA OF IGNORANCE, or, we didn't know it was loaded. Perhaps Jason members assumed through the early years of their involvement that the American presence in Vietnam was benign? After all, politics is not their field. Indeed, in some of them, we detect a certain alacrity to excuse (even exaggerate?) their own political naivete.

This seems a mere pose -- and one which they do not sustain, for at other moments they concede that politics is of the essence.

By 1966, they had available to them the writings of Jean Lacouture, Bernard Fall, and David Halberstam, as the rest of us did, and in addition they had all the secret reports which we could see only in tendentiously censored versions. They could get the true story of Ngo Dinh Diem's installation in power, of his Strategic Hamlet program, of his overthrow, of the activities of the CIA -- things which the public learned only later, after much effort.

We may agree that Jason politics were somewhat weak, in that knowing what was going on in Indochina they abetted it. But it would be embarrassing for these highly skilled scientists, with access to so much information, to claim that their politics are so weak that they did not know what was going on in Indochina!

There is no need for us to belabor the plea of ignorance because they do not make much of it. Even Donald Glaser, who is not pleased with the use the

government made of his Jason work in 1966 and does not report having done any since, seems perfectly sanguine about offering his services to the Pentagon in the future and taking his chances on the consequences.

This is an instance of

3B. THE POSITIVE-INTEGRAL THEORY. This concedes that something went awry somehow in Vietnam but maintains that this is more than offset by all the good the U.S. military is doing elsewhere -- in Europe and the Mid-East, maybe, or in deterring the Soviet Union, or even (some would say) in Taiwan. Or if you can't manage to cite enough good it's doing now, then throw in the good it may do in the future.

Thus Charles Schwartz describes the underlying assumptions when he worked at IDA (1962):

"Basically the assumptions boiled down to something like this: war is bad and nuclear war is terrible; the U.S. is the major force for good in the world; and communism -- either in the form of Soviet power plays or in the form of scattered guerrilla movements -- represents the major force for evil. Thus all questions of overall purpose were assumed answered."

Now we do not agree that the Vietnam war is a unique lapse from a generally constructive U.S. policy. We do not find the Yankee dollar so much less imperialistic in Latin America than in the Far East; we do not see that much less corruption in Chiang Kai-shek's government than in Ngo Dinh Diem's; we do not see any reason to expect Nixon to fight his next war any more altruistically or mercifully than the one in Indochina (though he will certainly try to fight it more successfully).

But even if the Jason doves regard the Vietnam war as an aberration, their appeal to the positive-integral theory puts them in a peculiar position. It is as if they witnessed inexcusable police brutality, and instead of exposing it, joined in the crime, on the grounds that other policemen somewhere else were helping nice old ladies across the street. Non sequitur!

To help the government do evil more effectively is not a way to induce it to do good.

Above all, to arm the government for counter-insurgency does not strengthen it for defense of liberty. Counter-insurgency research is by definition research on how to support unpopular regimes, on how to subject lightly armed populations to the will of heavily armed minorities. True, popular regimes may need defending in some future war, but the techniques that will be needed will be techniques of defending civilians, not of bombing and "resettling" them. Techniques developed perhaps by the North Vietnamese -- not by Jason.

We are left with a depressing conclusion. The liberal physicist has no basis at all to think he is doing any good by his eager service to the war machine.

Maybe he doesn't care.

J. Robert Oppenheimer described this amorality frankly: "...when you see something that is technically sweet you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success. That is the way it was with the atomic bomb. I do not think anybody opposed making it." The

context is relevant: Oppenheimer was pleading innocent to the charge of having applied moral standards when he later opposed the thermonuclear bomb! But his self-analysis seems incomplete, for he must have had "technically sweet" alternatives open to him in 1939 -- say, astrophysics. If it was not a moral, social objective which made the Manhattan Project seem more important, what then?



It seems clear that it was power. The confirmation that one can raise one's hand and make a city appear -- or make a city disappear, and that is likely to be easier. In short, there is one plausible motive for the Jason dove:

4. BEING WHERE THE ACTION IS. The Kissinger complex. He is attracted by the secrecy, by feeling close to the real center of power, by the gratification of having been admitted, by the size of the appropriations being discussed, by the sense of urgency, by the thrill of making history.

Chapter 4.

Accountability

One comment heard from several Jason people was that they were men deeply concerned over the possibility of their talents being used for harmful ends. This concern was usually phrased in terms such as, "I have to make the decision, according to my own conscience, of whether I should continue to consult for the government."

This seems to us to be a wholly inadequate way to put the question. A person's conscience is not formed in a vacuum but needs to be responsive to the opinions and desires (and the rights) of others in the community; yet this needed dialogue is prevented from taking place because of the adherence to the secrecy rules of the military. More important, however, in refuting this criterion of "personal conscience" is the fact that the work done by these scientific advisors has major impact on policies that spell life or death for people all over the world. In such circumstances, a posture of "I will decide what is best" is enormously arrogant.

In contrast to the Jason's criterion of "private conscience" we propose that their work should be evaluated through a process of public accountability. As scientists, these men have taken the fruits of all science - past and current - to use in their secret designs for the military establishment: thus they should stand accountable to all scientists. As professors at the universities (which most of the Jasons are) these men have taken the credentials of esteem and achievement from the entire academic community to propel

themselves into their positions of influence with the government: thus they should stand accountable to all teachers, students and researchers who comprise the academic corpus. And finally, as the results of their work are critical in determining policies of this nation, and those policies are often of vital significance to people across the globe, these men must stand accountable before all citizens of America and all people of the world.

An issue which arises in any campus controversy of this type is the appeal to academic freedom. When students try to stop, interfere with, or even question too closely, some university function (class, lecture, research project) that has a connection to some political controversy - they are accused of violating the academic freedom of those who scheduled the activity in question. Such squabbles over "time, place and manner" often obscure the desired debate over the political substance. In the same way, our assertion that professors are answerable to the community for their Jason work may be obscured by charges that we want to restrict their academic freedom to engage in research of their choice.

Indeed, the cry of "academic freedom" has already been raised by Professor Townes in his letter asking us not to publish the summary of our discussions with him. Townes does not explain what aspect of academic freedom he sees as relevant to this situation. It would appear, however, that he is claiming the right, under academic freedom, to keep his Jason, and other, outside consulting activities a secret from the public view. In fact, it is academic privilege which Professor Townes

so staunchly defends. Special privilege, claimed by the professor but not offered to the graduate student. The freedom of the big shot to do whatever he pleases without concern to his obligations to the University or anybody else. Are we to expect that a professor's secret, paid, highly political work will have no effect, even covert or unconscious, on the "objective" knowledge he imparts in the classroom? Can students evaluate classroom presentations from highly respected experts without knowing what they are paid for on the side?

This issue of outside consulting by university faculty goes beyond the immediate issue of Jason. The universities abound with faculty who consult, not only for the military, but for many governmental agencies and private corporations as well; consulting which takes time away from legitimate academic pursuits while adding significantly to the personal income of the consultant professor.


"Academic freedom" cannot be a legitimate excuse for not revealing the full scope of one's outside consulting activities - the point of academic freedom was originally to protect the powerless and sometimes unpopular scholar from the tyranny of the establishment.

Professor Townes, and his like, have no right to use this tradition to conceal the establishment's secrecy and their choice in selling out to it.

Clearly we can not depend on the institutions of establishment science to correct the abuses of consulting privilege. On the contrary, a committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Science recommended the following "cannon of ethics for applied scientists and technicians":

"Absolute secrecy where patients and industrial advantages are concerned; discretion in diplomatic matters where secrecy is essential during preliminary negotiations so that the negotiators are free to change their minds; security in matters of defense; confidentiality towards clients and patients; and loyalty to employing institutions where institutional aims are at stake." (emphasis added).

(Science, Vol 163, 1969, p. 787)



With a few notable exceptions (such as radiation physicists John Gofman and Arthur Tamplin), it is clear that academic consultants will not spontaneously become accountable and responsible to the public. It is up to those of us in the scientific and academic community, and in the general public, who see the dangers of unbridled academic privilege to bring about academic accountability by our own initiative.

Chapter 5.

Conclusion

In summary, we have seen that Jason scientists not only drew up the original plans for the automated battlefield in Vietnam, they also pointed the way for the future refinements of the system, continued to write study reports on particular aspects, made some personal visits to the field of battle to observe implementation of the scheme, and persisted in encouraging the military to expand its development of this new kind of warfare capability for worldwide use in the future.

(One thing we can be certain of: what we have presented in this booklet is only a small part of the whole story of scientists' complicity with the military. There is undoubtedly more secret work on the Vietnam war that Jason has carried out which has been kept from outside view; there is more than Vietnam that Jason works on for the military; and there is more than just the Jason group through which academic scientists work for war.)

(Most of the Jasons we spoke with would rather talk, and boast, of their contributions toward peace through work on arms control - concerning strategic nuclear bombs, missiles and submarines vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Some have pointed with pride to the nuclear test ban treaty and the recent SALT agreement. A full discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this booklet but it should just be noted here that the arms race has yet to be stopped and the Nixon policy - peace through strength - calls for new escalations in the tech-

nology of strategic armaments; and we may expect scientists of the Jason calibre have been and will be instrumental in helping the Pentagon get the "best" new weaponry that this country can produce.)

The overall result of Jason's, and other government scientists' contributions to the Vietnam war may be summarized as follows. Science has not won the war for the U.S., but it has been essential in preventing, or at least in postponing, a defeat for the U.S. aims in Indochina. (At this writing, it is unclear whether the "peace" which was announced to be "at hand" just before the Presidential election will prove to be a reality or a fraud.) Certainly, for the people of Indochina, the new style of American warfare, relying on high technologies and enormous firepower, has exacted a very painful price for their resistance to Nixon-America's idea of peace with honor.

It is also clear that the new military capabilities developed in Vietnam - automated devices to locate, track and, when desired, to destroy any object - will be available for use in the future. These devices, and their refinements, will stand as a potent threat to liberation movements abroad and at home.

If we were reading a Greek tragedy, we might say that the Jason scientists cannot be blamed for the monsters they have created, they are merely fulfilling the destiny laid out by Orwell in his prophetic book, 1984. But, being alive now, in the midst of this story, we would rather act than weep.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

The European scientists and students who confronted Gell-Mann, Drell and the other Jasons last

summer asked that these men acknowledge their contributions to the U.S. war effort in Vietnam and asked them to denounce this continuing criminal war.

From us - American citizens, American scientists, American students and teachers - the demands upon these of our own colleagues should be no less. We have a right, indeed a duty, to demand from the Jasons full accountability for their service to the military.

Just what this accounting should encompass and just what political processes should be employed to attain this end is something that needs to be widely discussed. The first step should be to circulate the information in this booklet so that the people on each campus can confront the Jason-types who reside or visit in their midst. The second step should be to undertake intensive research in order to uncover the full extent of outside consulting by faculty; then the people in each location can decide the best ways for them to move on these issues. We will present, below, a few of our own thoughts on this subject.

1. Many of us, like the authors of this booklet, are already convinced that the U.S. military establishment, as it is now, constitutes the dominant force for death, destruction and the suppression of popular movements for liberation throughout the capitalist ruled world. What we say to the Jason scientists is, Cease all your services for the Pentagon; repudiate the U.S. militaristic policies and the corruptions of science in that service; reveal whatever inside information you have about the military. Ellsberg did.

Those scientists who continue to work actively in support of imperialistic and warlike policies must be viewed, in some sense, as our enemies; we shall oppose them politically, as we have opposed Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and their many henchmen, both in and out of uniform, who have been their willing agents in prosecuting the war.

2. To members of the scientific profession as a whole, we speak as follows. Silence, acquiescence, laissez-faire attitudes towards the military involvements of a few scientists cannot be a sufficient reply to the questions of social responsibility in science. If we are to maintain our own hopes that science can really amount to more good than evil, if we are to keep - or to regain - the respect of the non-scientific public, then we must take some actions to offset the desecrations that our profession has incurred through the Vietnam atrocity. We call on all scientists to follow, not the highest bidder or the biggest dealer, but the worthiest uses of science and technology. The call for a more humane re-orientation of scientific efforts has been heard before; perhaps the story of Jason, because it is such a clear and odious example of the misuse of science, can serve as a pivot for a new turning. We ask all our fellow scientists to adopt these minimum habits:

(a) Gather, and publicize information on the misuses of science;

(b) Reject the rule of secrecy, insist on public accountability for all scientific endeavors;

(c) Maintain dialogue on these issues with your colleagues, both in and out of government service, and do not shy from letting the Jason-types know what you think of them and their work.

3. To the general academic community we ask the questions:

- What do you think about professors who consult for warmaking?
- for profit-making?
- for power-making?
- for status-making?
- Is it even known how much outside consulting is done by your local faculty "apparatchiks"?
- What special outside interests do they consult for?
- What justifications can there be for maintaining secrecy about either the extent or the substance of this consulting work?
- Isn't it paradoxical to allow secret military consulting by faculty members on campuses where secret military research projects are outlawed?
- When faculty members, such as Jason people, consult outside the university, whose interests do they serve?
 - Their own?
 - The university's?
 - Their employers?

